Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, set out the newly elected Labour government's position on Britain's entry into the European Monetary Union (EMU). The Chancellor had the difficult political task of neutralizing EMU as a political issue before it could cause the same ruinous divisions within the ranks of the government and its supporters as it had created in its conservative predecessor. His discursive strategy was clear: to itemize the measurable economic and financial considerations arising from EMU in such a thoroughly empirical manner as to relegate all but the most marginal objections to his program to the realm of the purely emotive. While conceding the incontrovertible point that the delegation of monetary policy to a European body is a major 'pooling of sovereignty',' Brown did not engage on any level the arguments concerning national identity that have underlain much debate over the issue. Wisely, he chose not even to ridicule them.
Brown's statement constituted a refusal to give any kind of hearing to the visceral fear of the effacement of national identity, which feeds much British hostility to EMU. For many people the only obvious manifestation of EMU will be the eventual replacement of British notes and coins with European notes and coins, and thus, to use the words of one television commentator, 'the end of the good old British pound'. The objects themselves, as much as the power to determine the quantity in which they are produced and the price at which they are hired, have come to be seen as crucial markers of national identity. It was vital to the wartime government that its currency notes gain ready acceptance among the masses. Desperate to avoid even a hint of financial crisis, the government of 1914 did not follow its 1797 predecessor by 'suspending payment', and the formal right to demand gold for notes that survived the war. The government's notes therefore required popular goodwill for their initial acceptance, and so were self-consciously designed to appear as items of mass consumption. Unlike any banknote previously seen in Britain, they were printed in colour. Their pictorial content was far greater than any English banknote, and became progressively greater in each of the three series issued. Indeed, so strong was the wartime government's commitment to coloured pictures that it was willing to use scarce resources to print them on the backs of the third series of notes, producing the first two-sided paper money ever seen in Britain. At 12 7 x 63mm (5" x 2.5") currency notes were far smaller than banknotes, and so could be carried more easily in the purse or pocket while one worked. Their written text emphasized their status as mass objects. In contrast to the highly individualized statement.f banknotes-1 promise to pay the bearer ...', currency notes-like soldiers-had no individual identity at all, and derived their power from their collectivity Each stated that These notes are a legal tender ...' or, Currency notes are a legal tender ...'.
It is significant that the government rejected the Bank of England's own design for low denomination notes. By the time war broke out the bank, whose notes then constituted more than 98% of all English banknotes, 6 stood readywith its own design for a it note. The note was interesting for the ways in which it attempted to meet the new circumstances, and striking in the ways it failed to do so. The new design differed from the bank's existing issues in only two respects. At 160 mm x 95 mm (6. 3" x 3.7"), it was just a little over half the size of the bank's existing notes, although still noticeably larger than the currency notes. It also had a modified promissory clause, presumably intended to address more socially and nationally diverse users. Instead of merely promising to pay the bearer, it spelt out that payment would be 'in Standard Gold Coin of the United Kingdom'. The note made no other concession to its intended new users. Like every other Bank of England note, it was printed on one side only in black and white; its surface was almost entirely taken up by the written text, and its only pictorial content was a small vignette of Britannia such as had appeared on all the bank's notes since the seventeenth century.
In strictly practical terms, the Bank of England's proposed note was probably adequate to the needs of its new workingclass users, even given their unfamiliarity with paper money. Only a few of the elderly were illiterate, and would have had trouble distinguishing denominations without the aid of differences of colour or size. In an age of mass-newspaper circulation, very few people would have had any more difficulty checking the authenticity of a predominantly textual note than a predominantly pictorial note.. The government's preference for coloured pictorial notes during the First World War clearly cannot be explained purely in terms of the practical needs of users, but rather, as I have suggested, in terms of the government's need to make the note attractive.
Another technique by which the government attempted to deflect any possible desire of holders to convert the notes to gold was, by proclaiming the notes themselves to be money rather than its representation. Currency notes did not derive their value from their convertibility to gold, dependent in turn upon the solvency of a bank, but were money by virtue of the unlimited sovereign will of their issuing authority, or, as the notes themselves said: 'under Authority of Act of Parliament'.
The notes' images signified their status as money as surely as their written text. To place the king's profile on the notes was simply to continue a tradition begun on British coins in the time of Edward the Confessor. This practice was extended in the second series of notes, issued only two months after the first, which had been designed and printed (on paper intended for postage stamps) in enormous haste. On the new notes the king was joined by a picture of St George slaying the dragon; a device which had made a brief appearance on the coins of Henry VIIP, and had been in continuous use on British coins since 1817. Unlike later efforts of the Bank of England, as we shall see, these notes were not merely aping coins: the representations of the king and St George were original, not copies of those on the coins.
King and saint together bound the notes pictorially to the nation and thus provided patriotic reasons to accept them. Indeed, all the spurs of patriotism were deployed to that end, not only on the notes themselves but in the discourse surrounding them. Even before they were issued, Lloyd George, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, made refusal of the notes a species of treason by declaring that anyone who ... withdraw[s] sums of gold and appropriate [s] them to his own use ... is assisting the enemies of his native land, and he is assisting them more effectively probably than if he were to take up arms'.8 As well as reporting Lloyd George's statement widely, newspapers also dug in the spurs from different angles. The Daily Mail simply presumed that 'people will doubtless have the sense ... to prefer paper to gold, knowing that the state had better have the metal', but for those short oǹ sense' the Mail made it clear that 'To have gold instead of letting the banks have it will be a disgrace'.9 The day after the notes' appeared the Daily Express and the Daily Mirror were anxious to stress that the notes had indeed found full acceptance, the latter with this patently fanciful report: Such heavy-handed attempts to render fear or doubt of the notes the exclusive preserve of the treacherous, the marginal, the inferior, and the ludicrous, are a measure of the traditional popular hostility to paper money that the government and its supporters had to overcome. That hostility had its origins in the monetary events of the French wars, when a shortage of gold obliged the government to allow the Bank of England to suspend payment, that is, to stop giving gold in exchange for its notes. To meet the resulting shortage of gold in circulation during this so-called `bank restriction period' banks were authorized to print II and £2 notes. For the first time significant numbers of illiterate and semi-literate people found themselves in possession of banknotes, with terrible consequences. Unlike a few provincial banks, which significantly increased the pictorial content of their notes for the lower denominations, the Bank of England made virtually no concessions to the needs of its new consumers.'2 Indeed, the demand for notes was so great that the bank actually lowered its standards of production in the interests of quantity, making life easier for forgers and correspondingly more difficult for people with no experience of scrutinizing written text, and who were now required-on pain of financial loss or criminal penalty-to distinguish between the genuine and the spurious. In an environment in which it was possible to pass a note headed `Bank of Engraving', it was relatively simple to pass serious forgery (figure 2).
The bank's response to these problems was to use the criminal law in the orthodox manner of the time.' 3 Forgers themselves were made to act to the full their part in the legal system's theatre of terror, the bank even going so far as to pay £78/12/6 (over £6,500 or A$i6,000 at today's values) to cover the expenses of having the execution of four forgers relocated from Warwick to Birmingham, solely for the purpose of attracting a bigger crowd.4 Against most of those who attempted to pass forged notes the bank preferred to press the charge of possession, rather than the capital charge of uttering. Those of the illiterate poor who attempted to save themselves from the financial disaster of !S-. It was to be four decades after the appearance of the third series currency notes before the Bank of England was to break radically with its own design traditions and produce a note with a similar rhetoric to that of the currency notes. The highly pictorial 195715 note was the first English banknote to be designed as a national item of mass consumption, and to present itself, albeit ambiguously, as money rather than its representation. As we might expect, the note appeared just as the big 'fivers', still with their 'traditional association with the plutocrat'2°were beginning to appear in the pay packets of 'some high wage industrial firms', although still rarely enough to warrant mention in the national press.2' Although workers may have welcomed the reduction from the octavo size of the old notes to a more manageable i6o mm x 90 mm (6.3" x 3.5"), coloured pictures were obviously completely unnecessary to enable them to identify and authenticate the notes. Even more than during the First World War, the change requires some other kind of explanation, and as in that war, the explanation may be found by scrutinizing the pictures (see image on front cover).
The 195 7 1,5 note was an orgy of nationalist symbolism. The front of the note is dominated by a bust of helmeted Britannia at left, whose Aryan (Saxon) beauty and blonde curls could equally well have graced a note of the Third Reich. At the bottom centre an armoured, helmeted, and haloed St George skewers the dragon only slightly less fearsomely than on the 1917 currency note. On the back, a large lion holding a double-sided key (allegedly to secure and release the nation's treasure) stands on a plinth facing the watermark silhouette of Britannia. None of these specific representations had appeared on any coin ever minted, although all of the subjects, the lion's key aside, had done so. Both of the Britannias were of the warlike, Athena-type, and thus so different from every other Britannia on English banknotes that they were, in effect, a different figure. It was perhaps fitting that this Athena-Britannia, familiar from coins, should appear on the bank's first new design as a nationalized institution, now institutionally more akin to the royal mint than to a private bank. The small, colourful, pictorial note intended for mass circulation was unequivocally money and not its representation, and like all of the money of the previous millennium, it claimed its legitimacy directly from that of the nation itself, represented by known symbols of national power. In keeping with the change, the now entirely vacuous promissory clause had been reduced to vestigial size and, along with the rest of the written text, appeared in a modern font which made no pretence of being handwritten.
1957 was not the Bank of England's first opportunity to produce such a note. In 1928 currency notes were replaced by the bank's own low denomination notes. Although the bank followed the precedent of the currency notes by using colour and printing the reverse sides, the bank was uncertain of how to produce notes for the use of the masses and whether to regard them as money or their representation. Following the express wish of the directors, the front of the notes looked much as the white notes had done for more than a century 22 Even the colour, although it covered most of the note, still gave the effect of sections of colour printed on a white note. The Britannia vignette was the same as that which had appeared on the white notes since 1855, and was framed by the same acanthus leaves. Britannia had, it's true, grown slightly in relation to the size of the note, dropped to a position somewhat closer to the vertical centre, and was for the first time balanced by a medallion showing the note's denomination numerically; but her shield still bore only the cross of St George, despite the note's legal tender status throughout the United Kingdom. The central feature of the note was the same text as on the white notes written in the same script, with almost identically eccentric capitalization (`I Promise to pay the Bearer on Demand the sum of II Viosp. The sum blockwas also a clear continuation of the style of the white notes ( figure 3) .
If the fronts of the notes displayed a reluctance by the bank to depart significantly from its established design formula, the reverse sides attested to a striking lack of imagination: On both notes most of the back was mere filler, in the form of a design 'worked up from the acanthus leaf device surrounding the seated. Britannia on the face'.23 The II note also carried a picture of the facade of the Bank of England's head office. While a number of provincial banks had included small vignettes of their head offices on their notes during the nineteenth century, the Bank of England's choice was made in the very specific context of the appearance of the Houses of Parliament on the back of the third series currency notes. The message was clear: the usurping government, which had not merely printed its own notes against the bank's wishes, but had offended so far as to buy its paper from someone other than Portals, the bank's supplier for over a century had been deposed.24 The business of note issue had reverted to its rightful place. In this respect then, the appearance of the bank's building on the note was a deliberate repudiation of the modern concept of a banknote as a national commodity bearing national meanings, and a reassertion of the concept that it was a private representation of money. It is little wonder that the Daily Mail thought the notes lacked 'that distinctively British air which belonged to the old and ios Treasury notes'.25
Another feature of the back of the Li note told the same story, even as it subverted it. Amid the acanthus leaves appeared two identical medallions of St George and the dragon copied precisely from the reverse of the gold sovereign. St George clearly was a national symbol, but the notion that the note was a representation of money, and not money itself, could hardly be more clearly conveyed than by including a picture 'exact to size' of the money which the promissory clause on the front of the note still feigned to offer in exchange for itself.
In 1 928, the notion that banknotes could, in principle, be exchanged for gold was even more important than it had been before the war. After abandoning the gold standard during the war, the government had restored it in 1925, at least in part as a matter of national prestige. The policy was problematic, controversial, and, as it turned out, unsustainable.26 The 1928 attempt to mimic pound notes to the unobtainable gold sovereign may be read as an attempt to assert what many desired but few believed: that pre-war monetary stability based on circulating gold could be willed back into existence. Paradoxically then, it was consistent with national policy that the bank produce notes which ignored the immediate precedent of the currency notes and eschewed national symbolism, just as it was consistent with national policy that the new notes should eschew any claim to be money rather than a representation of gold. By 1957, however, any allusion to gold was irrelevant, as the value of the pound was expressed not in terms of gold, but in terms of other currencies, most notably the US dollar.
It is remarkable that the bank issued its first nationalistic note in 195 7, rather than during the Second World War. The most significant change then was the withdrawal, after 1 943, of all denominations above £5 in order to keep a tighter rein on currency exchange and to 5o DAVID BLAMER make life more difficult for big operators in a cash economy that undermined the rationing system. No new designs appeared. As a protection against German forgeries, however, the bank issued tos and II notes with a metallic thread for the first time. In order to make clear that the notes were authentic, but slightly altered, the bank also changed their colour schemes. Conspicuously, the opportunity was not taken to produce new and bellicose notes a la 1 91 7, or indeed, 1957. While it is very difficult to explain a nonoccurrence, it is tempting to hypothesize that the Second World War, and the period immediately following, was a time when money occupied an unusually minor place in the national culture. The very muted response to the 3o% devaluation of the pound in 1949 , in contrast to the hysteria about Britain's national strength and moral worth surrounding the 14% devaluation in 1967, or the similar anxieties over the gold standard in the interwar period, suggests that this was a period in which the pound could not easily be pressed into service as a metonym of the nation. The invulnerability of the Beveridge proposals and the Labour Party's post-war program to critiques built around their effects on national finances points towards a similar conclusion, but takes us into issues beyond the proper scope of this paper.
The national status of banknotes was not finally sealed until 196o, when a new it note appeared which carried a portrait of the reigning monarch for the first time.
The representation of Britannia on this note returned to the style of the bank's early vignettes: helmetless, seated, and proffering an olive branch while casually supporting a slender spear. Her only armour was the shield leaning against her chair, emblazoned, of course, with the cross of St George. The Athena-Britannia figure had made her last as well as her first appearance in 1957. Indeed, even then it was understood that her role was, so to speak, merely to keep the seat warm for the queen, whose place on future notes had been reserved before that note was issued. Interestingly, the bank's traditional Britannia not only dominated the reverse of the 196o note, she also appeared on a medallion which slightly underlapped the medallion containing the queen's portrait on the front-a display of nostalgia for the bank's and its notes' private status on a par with the retention of the promissory clause.
Despite these nostalgic elements, the symbolic force of the queen was such that the notes were universally read as national objects. The unprecedented volume of press comment, including letters, shows unmistakably that the notes were therefore regarded as legitimate objects of public scrutiny and comment as no other banknotes had ever been. Naturally the bulk of comment, almost all of it hostile, was focussed on the portrait of the queen. Despite continuing with these complex articulations of national identity, the Bank of England's most recent notes evince a startling nostalgia for the days when note issue was a private concern. The £.5o note issued in 1 994 marked the bank's tercentenary by featuring a portrait of Sir John Houblon, its first governor (figure 5). Houblon's appearance is the revival of a scheme which reached the proof stage in 
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